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COMMENTS

ANALYSIS OF THE NCAA RULE
PROHIBITING A SCHOOL- OR
CONFERENCE-OWNED TELEVISION
NETWORK FROM TELEVISING HIGH
SCHOOL SPORTS EVENTS
BRANDON LEIBSOHN
I. INTRODUCTION
The latest trend in collegiate sports is the establishment of conference and
university television networks.1 National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) conferences have recognized the significant financial and publicity
benefits they can gain from owning and operating their own television
networks and from providing cost-effective programming on these networks.2
In particular, the Big Ten Network acquired over 30 million subscribers after
only one month of being on the air.3 Since its debut, the Big Ten Network has
accrued over 42 million subscribers, reaching over one-third of the United
States and allowing viewers to watch and enjoy conference sports events.4 In
2011 alone, the Big Ten Network collected $242 million in revenues with
$79.2 million in profits to be split among Big Ten schools.5
The Pac-12 recently launched its own conference network after noting the
Big Ten Network’s success.6 Last year, the Pac-12 began broadcasting on a
 Brandon Leibsohn is a third-year law student at Marquette University Law School. Upon
graduation in May 2013, he will earn a Certificate in Sports Law from the National Sports Law
Institute. Brandon graduated from Hamilton College in 2010, where he earned a B.A. in Psychology.
Brandon currently serves as a Comment Editor of the Marquette Sports Law Review.
1. See Joe Drape, Big Ten Network Alters Picture of College Athletics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
2010, at D1.
2. See id.
3. About Us, BTN, http://btn.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
4. Drape, supra note 1.
5. Stu Durando, Big Ten Network Had Record Revenue in 2011, STLTODAY.COM (May 21,
2012), http://www.stltoday.com/sports/college/illini/big-ten-network-revenue-grows-again/article_e0
5a998c-a390-11e1-99b2-001a4bcf6878.html.
6. Seth Davis, Pac-12 Network Looking to Change College Sports Landscape, SI.COM (Aug.
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national network and six regional networks covering each of its member
schools.7 The University of Texas has also reached a $300 million partnership
deal with ESPN to have its own network, the Longhorn Network.8 All of
these networks provide around-the-clock coverage of their respective schools’
sports events.9 The significant ratings result from football and men’s
basketball games; however, the spotlight the other sports receive is equally
important for the conferences and schools because of the potential for
increased fanfare and revenues in those sports.10
One of the more interesting topics to emerge from the growth of these
networks is the idea of covering high school sports events, particularly
football. When originally formed, the Longhorn Network intended to
broadcast live high school games along with highlights of high school sports
events.11 Controversy arose when Texas initiated this idea because other
NCAA schools felt that Texas would gain an unfair advantage in recruiting.12
In particular, Texas and other schools and conferences with their own network
would be able to offer recruits the chance to spotlight their talents for the
country to see even before they make it to college.
With the emergence of the Longhorn Network and issues relating to
showcasing high school games and events, the NCAA issued an interpretation
on August 12, 2011, to essentially ban youth programming on school- and
conference-owned networks.13 The interpretation states:
The academic and membership affairs staff determined it is
not permissible for an institution- or conference-branded
network to broadcast (audio or video) programming involving
prospective student-athletes.
[References: NCAA Constitution 2.11 (the principle
governing recruiting) and NCAA Bylaws 13.2.1 (general
regulation), 13.4.3.1 (recruiting advertisements), 13.10.3
(radio/TV show), 13.10.3.1 (announcer for broadcast of
prospective student-athlete’s athletics contest), 13.10.3.2
31, 2012), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/writers/seth_davis/08/30/Pac-12-Network/index.html.
7. Id.
8. Texas, ESPN Announce New Network, ESPN (Jan. 19, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/
news/story?id=6037857 [hereinafter Texas].
9. See Drape, supra note 1.
10. See id.
11. Texas, supra note 8.
12. Michael Hiestand, How Texas Is Steering College TV Sports, USA TODAY, Aug. 12, 2011,
at 1A.
13. NCAA, STAFF INTERPRETATION: BROADCASTS OF YOUTH PROGRAMMING ON
INSTITUTIONAL- OR CONFERENCE-BRANDED NETWORKS (2011) [hereinafter INTERPRETATION].
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(game broadcast/telecast), 13.15.1 (prohibited expenses) and
13.15.1.2 (fundraising for high school athletics program)].14
The NCAA’s interpretation banning youth programming has created a
situation where conference- and school-owned networks are prevented from
pursuing cost-effective broadcasting despite the fact that high school sports
broadcasts are cheap to produce and televise.15 Although there has been no
legal challenge to the interpretation as of yet, the purpose of this Comment is
to present a hypothetical case that a conference- or school-owned network
could bring to challenge the NCAA’s interpretation in an antitrust suit. Part II
details the need for universities and their conferences to capitalize on revenueproducing sources such as high school content. Part III describes the basics of
antitrust law and how parties have tried to challenge the NCAA with antitrust
suits in the past. Part IV discusses the hypothetical framework a network
could use in an antitrust suit against the NCAA for its interpretation that bans
high school content. Part V concludes.
II. ECONOMICS OF CONFERENCE- AND SCHOOL-OWNED TELEVISION
NETWORKS
The vast majority of NCAA school athletic departments fail to turn a
profit.16 Given these economic shortfalls, television revenue is highly
important. Conferences and schools are creating television networks because
of the significant financial and exposure benefits these networks can
generate.17 However, these networks require more than conference or school
sports events to provide quality programming at all times since games are not
played at all hours of the day. One potential option for fresh programming is
televising high school sports events.18
The growing appetite for televised high school broadcasts emerged during
LeBron James’s senior year in high school.19 Of all households watching
television during one of LeBron James’s high school games broadcast on
ESPN2, nearly two percent of those households were watching James that

14. Id.
15. See Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., 658 F.3d 614, 617 (7th Cir. 2011).
16. Associated Press, NCAA Report: Economy Cuts into Sports, ESPN (Aug. 23, 2010),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5490686. The exact number of athletic departments
earning or losing money each year is a heavily debated topic, but it is clear that many schools do fail
to earn a profit. Id.
17. See Hiestand, supra note 12; Davis, supra note 6.
18. See Kevin P. Braig, A Game Plan to Conserve the Interscholastic Athletic Environment
After LeBron James, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 343, 346 (2004).
19. Id.
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night.20 Since that broadcast, ESPN increased its high school sports coverage
to include thirty-three high school football games in 2011.21 In 2012, during
the high school football season opening weekend, ESPN broadcasted thirteen
high school games.22 Likewise, Fox Sports recently struck a deal with Texas
high schools to broadcast all ten of the championship games from the state.23
These decisions are clearly being driven by television ratings, fan support, and
cost-effectiveness because the networks do not have to pay high broadcast
rights fees for the sports events.24
When Texas announced its plan to show high school sports events on its
Longhorn Network, the plan was met by significant criticism from other
schools and the NCAA.25 On August 22, 2011, the NCAA hosted a
broadcasting summit to discuss high school sports.26 Following the summit
and a panel meeting at the NCAA Convention in January 2012, the NCAA
reinforced its interpretation banning youth programming on conference- and
school-owned networks.27 The NCAA’s interpretation refers to seven NCAA
bylaws and one article in the NCAA Constitution.28 Each of the references
relates to the principles of recruiting by schools, but none specifically refer to
conference- or school-owned broadcast networks.
This interpretation
negatively impacts the ability for these networks to utilize content as freely as
they could in the open market, and thus, the NCAA has subjected itself to
legal challenges such as antitrust claims.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs that would have standing to bring such a suit
against the NCAA would be a conference- or school-owned network desiring
20. Id.
21. Rick Cantu, TV Jumping as Audience Clamors for More Preps, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN
(Tex.), Sept. 17, 2011, at C01.
22. Christopher Parish, ESPN HS Football Kickoff Schedule, ESPNHS (Aug. 20, 2012, 9:00
AM), http://espn.go.com/blog/high-school/football/post/_/id/5919/schedule-released-for-third-annualespn-high-school-football-kickoff.
23. Cantu, supra note 21.
24. See id.; Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., 658 F.3d 614, 617 (7th Cir.
2011). For example, an ESPNU game of two high school powerhouse football teams in Indiana only
cost ESPN $500 to gain rights to broadcast the game. Cantu, supra note 21. Central Texas teams
appearing on the local KBVO affiliate did not receive any monetary compensation. Id. Further, the
Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association only charges $250 for a live stream of a football game
for one camera and $1500 if more than one camera is used. Wis. Interscholastic, 658 F.3d at 617.
25. Hiestand, supra note 12.
26. Michelle Hosick, NCAA Hosts Discussion About Youth-Sport Telecasts, NCAA (Aug. 22,
2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2011/August/
NCAA+hosts+discussion+about+youth-sport+telecasts.
27. New-Age Battle: Haves vs. Have-Nots, NCAA (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.ncaa.com/news/
ncaa/article/2012-01-17/new-age-battle-haves-vs-have-nots.
28. INTERPRETATION, supra note 13.
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to broadcast youth programming such as high school football games.
Currently there are only four networks owned by a conference or school that
could serve as potential plaintiffs: the Big Ten Network, the Pac-12 Network,
the Longhorn Network, and BYU Television.29 When the issue of youth
programming first was brought up last year, the Big Ten Network declared
that it would “‘refrain from telecasting high school games for at least the next
couple years.’”30 The Pac-12 Network and BYU Television have not issued
stances on broadcasting youth programming, but they have not made any plans
on their schedules to promote such content.31 That leaves the Longhorn
Network as the only potential plaintiff who currently would like to utilize such
content.32 It is clear that cheap programming enhances the bottom line for
profits for networks and if the potential gains become large enough, it is
possible that any of these networks or others that are created in the near future
could look to use high school programming.
III. PRIOR APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW TO NCAA REGULATORY
AUTHORITY
Prior to a school- or conference-owned network challenging the NCAA on
its denial of high school content, the network should examine the Sherman
Antitrust Act to ensure that the network’s claim meets all of the antitrust
criteria.33 The network must prove that the NCAA is engaging in concerted
action that unreasonably restrains trade involving interstate commerce.34 In
crafting its argument, the network should look at precedent established in key
cases challenging the NCAA for antitrust violations.
A. Foundation of Antitrust Law
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act to ensure that marketplaces
29.
See
About
Pac-12
Enterprises,
PAC-12,
http://pac-12.com/AboutPac12Enterprises/AboutPac-12Enterprises.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); About Us, supra note 3; Get
BYUtv, BYUTV, http://byutv.org/getbyutv/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); About, LONGHORN
NETWORK, http://espn.go.com/longhornnetwork/about (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
30. Brian Bennett, Delaney: BTN Won’t Air High School Games, ESPN (July 28, 2011,
6:55 PM),
http://espn.go.com/blog/bigten/post/_/id/29739/delany-btn-wont-air-high-school-games
(quoting league commissioner Jim Delaney).
31. See About Pac-12 Enterprises, supra note 29; Overview, BYUTV, http://www.byutv.org/
about (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
32. Mike Finger & Brent Zwerneman, Longhorn Network Still Has High School Football
in Its Plans, MYSA (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.mysanantonio.com/sports/college_sports/longhorns/
article/Longhorn-Network-still-has-high-school-football-2122892.php.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
34. See id.
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are competitive and that consumers can benefit from open competition.35
Specifically, § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states, “Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”36 Courts look at three
elements when analyzing this law.
First, courts consider whether there is concerted action, such as an
agreement made between parties who would otherwise be competitors.37
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that concerted action prevents
competition from having independence in decision-making and pursuing
activities in the marketplace.38 In the sports context, the case of American
Needle, Inc. v. NFL illustrates how the aggregation of team intellectual
property rights constitutes concerted action.39 In this case, the court concluded
that each of the NFL teams were independently owned and operated and that
each team could be considered an “‘independent center[] of decision[]making.’”40 The Court also found that pooling separately owned trademarks
and granting licenses for their use removes the independent nature of decisionmaking and impacts competition.41 The Supreme Court rejected National
Football League Properties’ (NFLP) argument that it was a single entity
because the teams each have their own individual interests and “separate,
profit-maximizing entities.”42 Even though the NFLP was acting as the
promoter of the trademarks and pursuing the common interests of the teams,
cooperation is not a relevant factor when determining if there is concerted
action.43 Without the agreement by the teams to combine their trademark
licenses, each team would be able to make decisions on granting licenses of its
trademarks.44 Thus, this case shows that concerted action can be proven if the
actors in the marketplace would be free to make decisions and perform actions
without an agreement to cooperate with their competitors.45
Second, courts look at the reasonableness of the restraint and whether the
35. MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 238 (2d ed. 2009).
36. § 1.
37. See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 250.
38. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2209 (2010).
39. See generally id.
40. Id. at 2213 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769
(1984)).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 2214.
44. Id. at 2214–15.
45. See id.
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procompetitive justifications of the restraint outweigh potential
anticompetitive effects.46 To determine the legality of potential antitrust
violations under the reasonableness of the trade restraint element, courts utilize
either the per se rule or rule of reason test.47 The per se rule presumes that an
action is unreasonable because the action has clear anticompetitive effects.48
An example of such a violation is price-fixing because, when competitors fix
prices, they inhibit free and open competition and hurt consumers.49
However, the court can choose not to apply the per se rule if the court
determines that certain actions, which would otherwise be considered
unreasonable, are necessary for the sustainability of the market.50 The court
has this option because competition in some markets is dependent upon
cooperation among competitors, who give up certain rights individually to
make the overall product better for the consumers.51 For instance, the NCAA
is composed of universities and schools around the country whose cooperation
is necessary to ensure competitive balance within each sport and to establish
uniformity in the rules and regulations each university must follow.52 These
factors combine to enhance the public’s interest in college sports, meaning the
per se rule application would undoubtedly harm consumers if used in such a
context.53
For cases involving sports law, most courts apply the rule of reason test to
address whether an action violates the Sherman Antitrust Act.54 As shown in
American Needle, when sports leagues require some cooperation to produce a
quality product, such as scheduling games and setting rules to protect
competitive balance, these justifications make the cooperation reasonable and
necessary to ensure the league can actually exist.55 In utilizing the rule of
reason test, courts make a fact-based determination on the actual
anticompetitive effects of the restraint and balance those effects with the

46. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 97–98 (1984); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019
(10th Cir. 1998); see also , e.g., Sarah M. Konsky, Comment, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA
Transfer Rules, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1581, 1588 (2003).
47. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103–04.
48. Id. at 100.
49. See Konsky, supra note 46, at 1588.
50. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100–01.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 101.
53. Id. at 117.
54. E.g., id.; Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998); Richard J Hunter, Jr. &
Ann M. Mayo, Issues in Antitrust, the NCAA, and Sports Management, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 69, 82
(1999).
55. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216–17 (2010).
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procompetitive benefits.56 In the current hypothetical case, the plaintiff, the
network, has the burden to prove the existence of anticompetitive effects,
while the defendant, the NCAA, has the burden to prove that its action has
procompetitive benefits outweighing those anticompetitive effects.57
The courts will assess and balance the anticompetitive and procompetitive
effects. One of the first steps courts will pursue is looking at the direct
anticompetitive effects and comparing what a free market would look like if
the restraints were to take effect.58 For example, courts examine whether the
output of products and services decrease in conjunction with a price increase
and if the market becomes unresponsive to consumer demand. 59 Of primary
concern is whether the courts will utilize a quick-look rule of reason or fullblown rule of reason analysis. The difference between the quick-look and fullblown analysis is that the quick-look analysis does not need to examine market
power because the anticompetitive effects are clear and obvious.60 If courts
fail to find a direct effect on the competitiveness of the market, they assess the
market power of the parties involved under the full-blown rule of reason
analysis.61 Courts determine market power by examining the relevant product
market and deciding whether a reasonable substitute could be implemented for
the service or product that consumers would find as attractive.62 If a party has
significant control over the market share and geographical area, courts are
likely to declare an action as having an effect on the competitiveness of the
market.63 Next, if the nature and quantity of the anticompetitive effects are
significant, then the defending party must show legitimate procompetitive
interests and justifications to overcome an antitrust challenge.64 If the
defendant can show this, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to then
demonstrate that the action is not the least restrictive alternative, meaning that
the interests and objectives could be accomplished in another less harmful
manner.65

56. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Claire E. Trunzo, Comment, Ancillary Restraints in a Competitive Global Economy: Does
the Possibility Exist for an Ancillary Restriction to Be Reasonable in Light of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act?, 29 DUQ. L. REV. 291, 299 (1991).
60. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
61. See Trunzo, supra note 59, at 299.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Konksy, supra note 46, at 1588.
65. Id.; see generally Renee Grewe, Antitrust Law and the Less Restrictive Alternatives
Doctrine: A Case Study of Its Application in the Sports Context, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 227 (2002).
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Finally, courts determine if the party’s restraint on trade affects interstate
commerce.66 The application of interstate commerce focuses on the effects of
the restraint including the transportation, purchase, and sale of commodities
across states.67 Contracts that make services available across multiple states
such that there is a nationwide operation can constitute interstate commerce,
particularly when the primary goal of the transaction is to earn profits across
the country.68 The U.S. Supreme Court declared in the case of United States
v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc. that when sports leagues “make
a substantial utilization of the channels of interstate trade and commerce”
through actions like negotiating the sale of television rights across the country,
then the sports league’s actions can be considered interstate commercial
activity, especially if the significant portion of the overall revenue from the
action arrives from these television rights.69
Thus, a school- or conference-owned network could better argue its
antitrust case by utilizing the arguments made in other antitrust suits and
incorporating each of the three antitrust considerations in its claim.
B. Understanding Antitrust Law Through Seminal NCAA Case Law
Over the past thirty years, the NCAA has been sued for numerous
potential violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.70 In each of the successful
challenges, the plaintiffs have demonstrated that the NCAA unreasonably
overstepped its authority in trying to create fair competition.71 The NCAA’s
desire to regulate issues such as television broadcasting, uniform logos,
coaching salaries and positions, and eligibility rules are all well-intentioned to
protect the integrity and amateurism of collegiate sports. However, when the
impact of those NCAA rules exceeds the nature of their intentions or fails to
achieve their intended goals in the least restrictive manner, then those rules are
subject to being considered unreasonable restraints and violations of antitrust
law.72
The landmark decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents demonstrates that the
NCAA is accountable for its rules and regulations.73 This case importantly
66. United States v. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 240–41 (1955).
67. See id.
68. See id. at 241.
69. See id., app. at 247.
70. See generally, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d
1010 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Hunter & Mayo, supra note 54, at 73–76.
71. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117–20; Law, 134 F.3d at 1021–24.
72. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117–20; Law, 134 F.3d at 1021–24.
73. See generally Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85.
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determined that when the NCAA tried to restrict the number of televised
broadcasts for its member schools, its rationale for supporting its restriction
could not overcome the anticompetitive nature of the restriction.74 The
NCAA’s plan restrained the price and output of collegiate football games
because there was clear evidence of consumer demand for televised football
games and additional money for schools to generate.75 Further, the NCAA’s
market power was strong because football games were uniquely attractive to
sponsors and advertisers providing television revenue.76 The Court dismissed
the NCAA’s justifications of increasing attendance at games, creating equality
in broadcasts per school, and maintaining competitive balance.77 Therefore,
because the NCAA failed to meet its burden of providing procompetitive
justifications for the restriction on the output of televised football games, the
Court ruled that the NCAA violated antitrust law.78
Based on the Board of Regents ruling, it is clear that in antitrust cases
against the NCAA, courts must determine if the NCAA’s actions promote
commercial interests or competitive interests for the benefit of its fans
(consumers). To ensure that a case can be brought forward, the cases of
Adidas America, Inc. v. NCAA79 and Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball
Ass’n v. NCAA80 highlight the need for a plaintiff to establish a marketplace
where the NCAA’s actions have an adverse effect on competition. Although
Adidas was unable to plead and prove that there was a defined relevant market
for the promotional rights of NCAA schools on athletic apparel,81 the
Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball Association (formerly responsible for
the National Invitation Tournament) overcame summary judgment because it
defined the relevant market as amateur college basketball tournaments, where
the market share of the NCAA’s March Madness tournament included over
99% of television revenue from the postseason tournaments, thereby
demonstrating that the NCAA controlled the market.82 The major factors in
defining the market include looking at the fungibility of the product and the
available substitutions.83 The Board of Regents case declared that there is a

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id. at 120.
Id. at 111.
Id.
Id. at 114–19.
Id. at 120.
64 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Kan. 1999).
339 F. Supp. 2d 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
Adidas, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 1102–03.
Metro. Intercollegiate, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 549–50.
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 111–12.

LEIBSOHN FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE)

4/26/2013 3:50 PM

2013] SCHOOL- OR CONFERENCE-OWNED NETWORK

445

separate market for college football broadcasts because there was no substitute
for advertisers to reach their target audience or for fans to gain their desire for
collegiate football on television.84 The fact that advertisers acknowledged that
they would be willing to pay premium prices to reach these fans indicated that
the product of college football broadcasts is itself a unique and separate
market.85 These cases emphasize the importance of establishing that a true
market exists before bringing forth an antitrust claim against the NCAA.
Once a true market is established “or a horizontal agreement to fix prices”
is shown, the NCAA is subject to scrutiny over its rules.86 The burden shifts
to the NCAA to prove procompetitive justifications when there are
anticompetitive effects in the marketplace.87 Anticompetitive effects occur
when the freedom to operate in the marketplace is taken away from
competitors.88 Thus, actions by the NCAA typically remove that freedom
because the schools lose their ability to act independently in the market of
college sports. Of the few successful antitrust challenges to the NCAA’s
rules, the Board of Regents and NCAA v. Law cases highlight how the typical
procompetitive justification of competitive balance offered by the NCAA is
not absolute.89 In particular, these cases show that the NCAA will advocate
competitive balance.90 The courts acknowledge this goal as legitimate, but the
NCAA’s rules must actually achieve competitive balance if they are to be
upheld.91 In Board of Regents, the ban on televised broadcasts did not
equalize the competitiveness of all schools because the ban did not cap
spending by schools on their football teams or dictate how revenues from the
teams were to be spent.92 In Law, the NCAA’s restriction on earnings and
positions for college basketball staffs failed to protect competitive balance
because more experienced coaches could still stay on the staff at the low
salary, and the schools were not prohibited from spending the savings on other
areas of their teams.93 Accordingly, the NCAA’s actions must actually
maintain or improve competitive balance as opposed to merely putting a BandAid on a small issue.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1020–21.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 106–07.
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117–20; Law, 134 F.3d at 1023–24.
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117–20; Law, 134 F.3d at 1023–24.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117.
Id. at 117–19.
Law, 134 F.3d at 1024.
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Additionally, the NCAA has asserted the preservation of amateurism as a
main procompetitive interest.94 In Gaines v. NCAA, the NCAA’s rule
prohibiting athletes who declared for the draft and hired an agent from
regaining collegiate eligibility was upheld by the district court as necessary for
the preservation of its amateur competition.95 According to the court, the
protection of amateurism is not a derivative of promoting commercial
interests.96 Rather, amateurism interests ensure that college football is not a
professional sport and that student-athletes act in the interests of themselves,
their fellow classmates, and schools.97 In reinforcing the draft eligibility rules,
the court determined that the NCAA enhanced its product by protecting
stability and integrity within its system.98
Part IV of this Comment provides for a hypothetical framework that a
school- or conference-owned television network could utilize in an antitrust
suit against the NCAA, as well as addressing the likelihood of success of such
a suit.
IV. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF NCAA PROHIBITION AGAINST TELEVISING
HIGH SCHOOL SPORTS
Of primary concern for a conference- or school-owned television network
is illustrating all of the antitrust requirements established in § 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act. First, the network must show that the NCAA is engaging in a
concerted action by trying to control the network’s content.99 Second, the
network must demonstrate that the NCAA’s action involves interstate
commerce.100 Finally, the network must prove that the NCAA’s concerted
action is unreasonable by showing anticompetitive effects and the NCAA’s
market power.101 If the network can illustrate anticompetitive effects or show
that the NCAA has significant market power over conference- and schoolowned television network content, then the NCAA will have to provide
procompetitive justifications for its interpretation. The networks will then
have to establish that the NCAA’s ban on high school sports broadcasts is not
the least restrictive alternative to achieve its goals.102 A final decision as to an
94. See Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
95. Id. at 741, 747–48.
96. Id. at 744.
97. Id. at 746.
98. Id.
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Konksy, supra note 46, at 1588.
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antitrust violation will be decided by a jury.103 The procompetitive
justifications that will enable the NCAA to prevail against an antitrust
challenge by a conference- or school-owned network are promoting
amateurism, maintaining competitive balance, and emphasizing academics
over athletics.
A. NCAA Concerted Action
To challenge the NCAA on its interpretation banning high school sports
programming being broadcast, a conference- or school-owned network must
show concerted action taken by the NCAA that unreasonably restrains trade
affecting the network.104 The network could argue that the NCAA has
engaged in concerted action to ban high school sports broadcasts on
conference- and school-owned networks because the NCAA’s rule is a product
of an agreement by the member schools allowing the NCAA to act as a body
representing member schools that would otherwise be competitors.105 Thus,
the network would be able to show the NCAA’s ban on such content
eliminates what its member schools could do if able to make their own rules.
B. Interstate Commerce
The easiest portion of the antitrust lawsuit the network would need to
prove is that the NCAA’s restriction of youth programming broadcasts
involves interstate commerce. Provided that the network is available for
broadcast in multiple states,106 which is the case for all current conferenceand school-owned networks, then the revenues generated by the network
would come across state lines. For example, the network could show that
since it is broadcast on major television providers such as AT&T U-Verse,
DIRECTV, Dish Network, Time Warner, and Verizon FiOS, where it collects
carriage fees from consumers in different states, the commercial aspect of its
network impacts those states in which its network is available.
Fundamentally, if consumers from around the country are paying for cable and
the network is available through their television provider, then the network is
receiving its revenue through interstate commerce. Therefore, the network’s
main concern would move towards the unreasonableness of the NCAA’s
103. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 33 (2008).
104. MITTEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 238.
105. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98–99 (1984); MITTEN ET AL., supra note 35,
at 250.
106. About Us, supra note 3; Davis, supra note 6; Get BYUtv, supra note 29; Ben Kercheval,
LHN Officially Adds AT&T U-Verse to Carriers, NBC SPORTS (Sept. 1, 2012),
http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2012/09/01/lhn-officially-adds-att-u-verse-to-carriers/.
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restriction of high school sports broadcasts.
C. Per Se Rule Analysis
To determine unreasonableness, courts decide whether to employ the per
se or rule of reason analysis.107 As described in Board of Regents, the NCAA
will generally not be held to the per se standard.108 To ensure competitive
balance among the NCAA’s schools, the NCAA needs to make some
horizontal restraints that would otherwise be considered illegal under the
Sherman Antitrust Act.109 To challenge such a notion, a network would have
to show that the NCAA’s interpretation, which bans broadcasting of high
school sports events, is a clear restraint on the network’s market, especially in
light of the fact that there are no current NCAA bylaws that specifically detail
the nature of conference- and school-owned networks. Yet, it is very likely
that the NCAA could overcome this argument, primarily based on its need to
protect competitive balance, but also on its mission to protect amateurism of
its sports.110
D. Rule of Reason Analysis: Unreasonable Restraint and Market Power
Consequently, the network should be prepared to argue under the rule of
reason test for the NCAA’s potential violation of antitrust law. The network
must establish that the NCAA’s interpretation banning high school broadcasts
produces anticompetitive effects in the marketplace. By restricting output of
high school sports broadcasts and reducing revenue streams for the network,
the network could demonstrate the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s ban
on high school content, which would be sufficient to justify the quick-look
rule of reason analysis. However, if the court chooses to use the full-blown
rule of reason analysis, then the network would need to show that the NCAA
has market power over televised high school sports events because of its
control over revenue streams for its member schools and conferences. Yet, the
network should be aware that the NCAA is likely to prevail against these
anticompetitive effects and market power arguments because of its
procompetitive justifications for protecting amateurism, competitive balance,
and the value of education.

107. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103–04.
108. See id. at 100–01.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 117, 120; see also Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023–24 (10th Cir. 1998);
Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743, 747–48 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
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1. Anticompetitive Effects
The court could utilize the quick-look or full-blown rule of reason analysis
in determining that the NCAA’s interpretation prohibiting high school sports
broadcasts is clearly anticompetitive.111 Regardless, first the network must
show that the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s action prevent high
school sports events from being broadcast on school- or conference-owned
networks.112 It is clear that such a ban restricts output of televised high school
sports events. Although the NCAA is not responsible for ensuring that such
content can be broadcast, the network could show that the ban on the youth
programming negatively impacts the market. To make such a claim, the
network would need to conduct a study or survey sports fans and television
viewers to see the effect that high school programming would have on their
desire and commitment to watch the conference- or school-owned network if
the high school sports events were available. This type of study would
undoubtedly be expensive and time-consuming but nonetheless would provide
one of the most accurate pieces of evidence. This data could show that the
NCAA’s interpretation prevents the network from meeting consumer demand,
which is more high school sports events on television.
The network should also show that the anticompetitive effect of the
NCAA’s ban inhibits the network from generating more revenue for cashdeprived schools and inflicts commercial restraints such as those seen in
Law.113 With the rising costs associated with sports programming, high
school sports present a great opportunity for a network to draw in significant
audiences while spending minimally to gain such viewership.114 If no ban
were in place, the network could contract with high schools to increase ratings
and advertising revenue at a minimal cost.115 As the NCAA has clearly shown
through its own deal with CBS and Time Warner, maximizing revenue from
television deals is vital for collegiate athletics.116
Accordingly, the court could decide that the anticompetitive effects are so
obvious that an assessment of market power is not necessary based on the

111. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1020.
112. See Konsky, supra note 46, at 1588.
113. See Law, 134 F.3d at 1020–21, 1024.
114. See Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., 658 F.3d 614, 617 (7th Cir. 2011);
Braig, supra note 18, at 346–47; Cantu, supra note 21.
115. See Wis. Interscholastic, 658 F.3d at 617; Braig, supra note 18, at 346–47; Cantu, supra
note 21.
116. See CBS Sports, Turner Broadcasting, NCAA Reach 14-Year Agreement, NCAA (Apr. 22,
2010), http://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/2010-04-21/cbs-sports-turner-broadcasting-ncaa-re
ach-14-year-agreement.
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quick-look rule of reason analysis. However, it is unlikely that the network
would engage in the necessary steps to ensure that the anticompetitive effects
justify the quick-look analysis. Demonstrating consumer demand for the high
school sports events inevitably would be a costly and time-consuming
endeavor. Further, the network would need to show actual deals that it could
strike with high school athletic associations to broadcast the events if
permitted by the NCAA to prove the cost-effectiveness and savings from the
programming. Thus, the amount of work that would need to go into
establishing clear anticompetitive effects would entail research and
negotiations that the networks might not be able or willing to undergo. If the
network were able to spend the necessary resources, then the court would
likely shift the burden onto the NCAA to justify the procompetitive effects of
its ban.117
2. Full-Blown Rule of Reason Analysis: Market Power
If a court determines that the quick-look rule of reason analysis is
inappropriate in the case, then the court would apply the full-blown rule of
reason analysis and require the network to also show that the NCAA has
significant control of the market power of televised high school sports
events.118 The network would need to prove that a market for televised high
school sports events exists and that the NCAA is inhibiting the network’s
position in such a market in accordance with the Adidas case.119 The Adidas
court stated that the market depends on the “‘interchangeability of use or the
cross-elasticity of demand’” of the products.120 Further, the network has to
show that the NCAA’s interpretation regulates and has an effect on the
market.121
In addressing the relevant product market, the network would have to
show that there is no interchangeability or cross-elasticity of demand between
televised high school sports events and other sports broadcasts. The network
would need to prove that there is no reasonable substitute for the televised
high school sports events, which it could do if it showed that the high school
sports events such as football are played primarily during the week while other
amateur sports such as college football are played mostly on the weekend and
that the other broadcasters of high school sports are unable to meet the

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See Law, 134 F.3d at 1020–21.
See id.
See Adidas Am., Inc. v. NCAA, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1101–04 (D. Kan. 1999).
Id. at 1102 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)).
See id. at 1104.
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demand, which the conference- and school-owned networks would be able to
accomplish. Further, given that major sports broadcasters like ESPN and Fox
Sports have struck deals to broadcast high school sports events, there appears
to be a set of fans and consumers desiring to watch who would otherwise
spend their time in some other activity.122
Next, the network would have to show that the NCAA interpretation has
an effect on televised high school sports events. The network would have to
show that the NCAA, the governing body of collegiate sports, is attempting to
control the market by removing a significant portion of the televised high
school sports event broadcasters, conference- and school-owned networks. If
the NCAA is permitted to control the television content that conference- and
school-owned networks can broadcast, then its effect on the market for
televised high school sports events will be significant because it will limit the
availability of high school sports event telecasts to other broadcasters that have
not met the demand for the market. Assuming the conference- or schoolowned network can prove that there is an additional desire for more high
school sports events than already on television, it could also show potential
damages in the form of lost revenues by showing the success of the Big Ten
Network123 and the new billion-dollar deals collegiate conferences have struck
with entities such as ESPN and Fox Sports.124 Thus, provided that the
network establishes the NCAA’s effect on televised high school sports events,
then the NCAA would have to show legitimate interests and justifications for
the imbalance it created.125
3. NCAA’s Procompetitive Effects
After the court has determined whether a quick-look or full-blown rule of
reason analysis is necessary, the NCAA must meet its burden of providing the
procompetitive rationales regarding its ban on high school sports events.126
The main procompetitive justification that the NCAA has described in its
interpretation, and that it is likely to offer in this case, is competitive balance.
The NCAA would likely point out that allowing high school broadcasts would
create a competitive disadvantage to conferences and schools unable to form
their own television networks in recruiting these high school athletes and
providing cost-effective programming. While the network could argue that it
122. Braig, supra note 18, at 346–47; Cantu, supra note 21; Parish, supra note 22.
123. Drape, supra note 1.
124. Diane Pucin, Pac-12 Will Feast on New Television Deal, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 2011, at C1;
Pete Thamel, TV Deal May Help Secure the Big 12, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2011, at B11.
125. See Konsky, supra note 46, at 1588.
126. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021 (10th Cir. 1998).
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opens up exposure to these recruits, the star players who drive the specific
games to be televised would be inherently more attracted to the network
showcasing them because of the publicity they can gain from television
exposure. Further, it is clear that schools such as Texas have the fanfare to
generate their own television network,127 but for most Division I schools, it
would be much harder to establish such a network. Thus, unless every
conference or school had such a network, the access to the athletes and the
revenue produced from broadcasting their games would provide significant
competitive advantages to the schools and conferences with their own
networks.
Another potential procompetitive justification is the same one the NCAA
offered in Gaines: preserving amateurism.128 The NCAA prides itself on
maintaining the amateur nature of its sports events.129 The potential problems
involved with high school athletes being showcased on networks could make it
even easier for schools and boosters to try to gain recruiting edges by knowing
which athletes to target and offer illegal inducements to because the level of
access and knowledge of recruits would increase. These inducements could
come in the form of monetary payments, gifts, or other benefits, which would
turn the high school athletes into professionals being compensated for their
athletic abilities. Clearly the NCAA wants to maintain amateurism of its
athletes, and it believes that prospective recruits should not be given special
exposure as demonstrated by its bylaws 13.4.3.1, 13.10.3, and 13.15.1.2,
which prohibit advertisements, interviewing or showing highlights of the
recruit during a broadcast of the university’s game or coach-sponsored
program, and fundraising for high school teams.130
4. NCAA’s Actions as Least Restrictive Alternative
After the NCAA offers its procompetitive justifications of competitive
balance and the preservation of amateurism, the burden of proof then shifts
back to the network to show that the interpretation the NCAA set forth is not
the least restrictive means for accomplishing the NCAA’s goals.131 It is
unlikely that the network would be able to overcome the NCAA’s need to
protect competitive balance and, to a lesser degree, to preserve of amateurism.
Specifically, the NCAA’s interpretation prohibits televised high school sports
127.
128.
note 13.
129.
130.
131.

See Texas, supra note 8.
See Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); INTERPRETATION, supra
See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984).
2011–2012 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL §§ 13.4.3.1, 13.10.3, 13.15.1.2.
Law, 134 F.3d at 1019.
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events outright instead of some restrictions because the schools and
conferences without their own networks would not be subjected to the
recruiting disadvantages associated with broadcasting high school sports
events. A restriction that the NCAA could place would be to prevent the
network from broadcasting games with athletes that the school or schools in
the conference are recruiting, but then the concern would be how to regulate it
if athletes shine in their telecasts and the schools then want to pursue them.
The network would have a better case if each conference, school, or both had
its own network because then the recruiting disadvantages would be
minimized to a degree. However, with only four true networks currently
established, the NCAA’s ban appears appropriate. Further, the network could
potentially utilize other cheap programming, such as debate shows or
symposiums of the coaches in the conference or school on topics of interest in
college sports, in lieu of the high school sports without compromising
competitive balance. Thus, the network would have a hard time establishing
that the NCAA’s outright prohibition is not necessary to protect competitive
balance.
5. Jury Determination
The final determination would be made by the jury. The jury would weigh
the anticompetitive effects with the procompetitive justifications offered by
the NCAA and take into consideration if the network has shown that the
NCAA’s ban on high school sports is not the least restrictive means of
protecting competitive balance and amateurism.132
After careful
consideration, it is likely that the NCAA would prevail and show that it has
not violated antitrust law in its interpretation. While there may be
anticompetitive effects of reducing the availability of televised high school
sports events and preventing the network from utilizing cheap and popular
programming, the NCAA itself does not profit monetarily from its position.
The NCAA interpretation does have an impact on the market for televised
high school sports events, but the significance of the impact would have to be
proven by the network. The amount of resources the network would need to
expend to prove the impact would be costly and time-consuming, and thus, it
would be unlikely that the network would have enough evidence to
demonstrate the impact. Assuming the network could prove the impact, then
the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications of competitive balance and
preservation of amateurism would likely hold considerable weight in the
minds of the jury. Without an outright ban, the NCAA would be unable to

132. See Crane, supra note 103, at 33.
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protect the competitive balance of schools and conferences without networks
to broadcast the high school sports or, to a lesser degree, weed out the negative
influences and illegal inducements of those athletes spotlighted on the
telecasts. Accordingly, the jury would likely find in favor of the NCAA.
V. CONCLUSION
In prohibiting high school sports events from being broadcast on schooland conference-owned networks, the NCAA has subjected itself to a potential
antitrust violation. Given that the NCAA has an effect on the televised high
school sports events market and the networks would be able to produce costeffective programming, the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications of
competitive balance and the preservation of amateurism must be accomplished
in the least restrictive manner possible. Although it is likely that a court will
give the NCAA strong discretion in implementing rules and regulations to
achieve these goals, the NCAA should clearly define what can and cannot be
done in regard to high school sports being broadcast on the networks in its
bylaws and constitution.
After analyzing the NCAA’s ban on high school sports through the
hypothetical suit described in Part IV, it is clear that the NCAA must address
the issues of conference- and school- owned television networks. Although
the NCAA’s interpretation lists certain bylaws already in place for the
recruitment of student-athletes, there is no set of rules specifically set for
school- and conference-owned networks. Even though the NCAA has
attempted to quash the issue surrounding high school sports broadcasts, it is
still vulnerable to an antitrust violation because of its outright ban in this and
other future instances where the NCAA tries to control such programming.
The NCAA must continue to host broadcasting summits like it did in August
2011 and must prepare itself to legitimately create rules and regulations on
what can and cannot be done on such networks. Therefore, while the NCAA
may be able to skirt past antitrust violations in this instance, it would behoove
the NCAA to make sure it can effectively combat such a claim if it does arise
in the future by implementing clear rules and standards for conference- and
school-owned television network content that have appropriate procompetitive
justifications surrounding them.

